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Abstract
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our char-
acterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and
simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so
it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When prefer-
ences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure
of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core
matchings.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the many-to-one matchings that are in the core. Given a set
of workers and a set of firms, a many-to-one matching (a matching, for short) is an
assignment of a group of workers to each firm. The problem is interesting because each
worker has a preference relation over firms, and each firm has a preference relation over
groups of workers. Given a matching, firms who are unhappy with their current group of
workers, and workers who are unhappy with their current employers, may recontract in a
mutually beneficial way, thus destroying the proposed matching. Arguably, the natural
formalization of matchings that are robust to recontracting is the core (see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990), RS in the rest of the paper, for definitions).
The standard approach to the core (RS is a classic) is to impose some structure on
firms’ preferences that both simplifies the core and ensures that it is non-empty; the
structure used is to assume that firms’ preferences are “substitutable” (see RS, or our
Definition 5 below). When preferences are substitutable, a matching is in the core if
and only if it is “stable”—a stable matching is robust to recontracting by worker-firm
pairs, but not more complicated coalitions. Further, there is an algorithm, the “deferred
acceptance algorithm” (DAA) which finds certain distinguished core matchings: the DAA
finds a core matching that is better for the firms than all other core matchings, and a
core matching that is better for the workers than all other core matchings.
Our approach is different. We characterize the core as the set of fixed points of a map
T . We do not add structure to the model, so the core (and the fixed points of T ) may
be empty. Our characterization is useful because it allows us to:
1. Construct a simple algorithm that consists in iterating T , we shall call it the T -
algorithm. The T -algorithm either finds a core matching or cycles in a recognizable
way. Unlike the DAA, the T -algorithm does not stop at a non-core matching.
We present an example where the DAA stops at a non-core matching, while the
T -algorithm succeeds in finding a core matching.
∗We are grateful to Alejandro Neme and Ruth Mart´ınez for their helpful comments.
2. We prove that, when preferences are substitutable, T has at least one fixed point—
hence that the core is non-empty—and that the T -algorithm finds the two distin-
guished core matchings: the matching that is best for the firms and the matching
that is best for the workers.
We can bound the computational complexity of the T -algorithm. To the best of
our knowledge, the computational complexity of the DAA for the many-to-one case
is unknown. 1
3. Blair (1988) proves that, when preferences are substitutable, the core matchings
have a lattice structure.
(a) Our characterization gives a very simple proof of Blair’s result; it follows
almost immediately from Tarski’s fixed point theorem, as T is a monotone
map under an appropriate order.
(b) There is no formula for computing Blair’s lattice operations (join and meet).
We show how the T -algorithm computes the join and meet of any two core
matchings.
Our results on the core build a bridge to the literature on supermodular games (see
Topkis (1998)); in fact, our results on the T -algorithm are adapted from similar results
on computing Nash equilibria in supermodular games. We believe that this bridge is
useful for understanding matching problems better, and may deliver further results in
future research.
Fixed-point methods have been used in the matching literature before. Tarski’s fixed-
point theorem was applied by Roth and Sotomayor (1988) to the assignment game,
Adachi (2000) to one-to-one stable matchings, and Fleiner (2001) to many-to-one stable
matchings. Fleiner’s is the paper closest to our paper; he proves a version of Blair’s
lattice result for a general graph-theoretic model. Fleiner’s model includes the many-
to-one matching model with substitutable preferences as a special case. Fleiner’s paper
is a paper in graph theory, though, and his results are very hard to translate into the
language of matching models. For that reason, we believe that our result in (3.a) above
is valuable, beyond its auxiliary role in our other results.
We should clarify at this point that “core” is RS’s “weak core.” We do not have
results for RS’s “strong core,” hence we opted, in the interest of exposition economy,
for omitting all “weak” qualifiers from the paper. Nothing is really known about the
strong core, so we feel that our omission is justified. See RS, and Sotomayor (1999), for
a discussion of the different core definitions.
In Section 2 we define the model, and prove some preliminary results on the core many-
to-one matchings. In Section 3 we introduce our fixed-point approach to the core. In
Section 4 we introduce the T -algorithm. In Section 5 we study the lattice structure of the
core many-to-one matchings. In Section 6 we analyze the T -algorithm for substitutable
preferences.
1Gusfield and Irving (1989) prove that the DAA is O(n2) for one-to-one matchings.
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2 Preliminary definitions and results
2.1 The Model
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n firms F and the set of m workers W .
Each firm f ∈ F has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P (f) over the
set of all subsets of W , and each worker has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation P (w) over F ∪ ∅. Preferences profiles are (n+m)–tuples of preference
relations; we denote them by P = (P (f1) , ..., P (fn) ;P (w1) , ..., P (wm)).
Given a firm’s preference relation, P (f), the sets of workers that f prefers to the
empty set are called acceptable; thus we allow that firm f may prefer not hiring any
worker rather than hiring unacceptable subsets of workers. Similarly, given a preference
relation of a worker P (w) the firms preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable;
in this case we are allowing that worker w may prefer to remain unemployed rather than
working for an unacceptable firm. It turns out that only acceptable partners matter, so
we shall write preference relation concisely as lists of acceptable partners. For example,
P (fi) = {w1, w3} , {w2} , {w1} , {w3}
indicates that {w1, w3}P (fi) {w2}P (fi) {w1}P (fi) {w3}P (fi) ∅ and
P (wj) = f1, f3
indicates that f1P (wj) f3P (wj) ∅.
We denote by R the weak orders associated with P . So, fiR (w) fj if fi = fj or
fiP (w) fj. Similarly for R (f).
We shall study assignments of workers to firms as matchings of firms with groups of
workers. The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms maintaining
the bilateral nature of their relationship, and allowing for the possibility that both firms
and workers may remain unmatched. Formally,
Definition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of all subsets
of F ∪W such that for all w ∈ W and F ∈ F :
1. Either |µ (w) | = 1 and µ (w) ⊆ F or else µ (w) = ∅.
2. µ (f) ∈ 2W .
3. µ (w) = {f} if and only if w ∈ µ (f) .2
2We shall often abuse notation by omitting the brackets to denote a set with a unique element; here
we write µ (w) = f instead of µ (w) = {f}.
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Given (F,W, P ) we denote the set of matchings by M. A matching µ is said to be
one-to-one if firms can hire at most one worker; namely, condition 2 is replaced by:
Either |µ (f)| = 1 and µ (f) ⊆ W or else µ (f) = ∅. The model in which all matchings
are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage model .
We shall represent matchings as follows. Let F = {f1, f2, f3} be the set of firms, and
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} the set of workers. One possible matching is:
f1 f2 f3 ∅
µ = {w3, w4} {w1} ∅ {w2}
where firm f1 is matched to workers w3 and w4, firm f2 is matched to worker w1, and
firm f3 and worker w2 are unmatched.
Let P be a preference profile. Given a set S ⊆ W , let Ch (S, P (f)) denote firm
F ’s most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (f). We call
Ch (S, P (f)) the choice set of S according to P (f). That is, A = Ch (S, P (f)) if
and only if A ⊆ S and AP (f)B for all B ⊆ S with A 6= B.
2.2 The core, stable matchings, and stable* matchings
A matching µ is stable if no worker-firm pair can benefit by deviating from µ. RS prove
that, if firms’ preferences are substitutable, the set of stable matchings equals the core.
A matching is stable* if no set of workers can, jointly with one firm, benefit from
deviating from µ. We prove that the set of stable* matchings equals the core; the
result does not require additional assumptions on preferences. We use the notion of
stable* matching instead of stable matching because our fixed-point approach allows us
to characterize the set of stable* matchings, and thus the core. It should be clear from
our proofs and examples just how useful the stable* definition is.
Let P be a preference profile and let µ be a matching. Say that µ is individually
rational if µ(w)R (w) ∅ for all w ∈ W , and if µ(f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) , for all f ∈
F . Intuitively, µ is individually rational if no agent can unilaterally improve over its
assignment by µ—workers by choosing to remain unemployed and firms by firing some
of its workers.
A worker-firm pair (w, f) blocks µ if w /∈ µ (f), w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w} , P (f)), and
fP (w)µ (w); that is, if w and f are not matched through µ, firm f wants to hire w—
possibly after firing some of its current workers in µ(f)— and worker w prefers firm f
over her current match µ (w).
Let P be a preference profile and let µ be a matching. A pair (B, f) ∈ 2W × F , with
B 6= ∅, blocks* µ if
fP (w)µ(w),
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for all w ∈ B, and there is A ⊆ µ (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f)µ (f) .
In words, (B, f) blocks* µ if firm f is willing to hire the workers in B—possibly after
firing some of its current workers in µ(f)—and all workers w in B prefer f over their
current match µ(w).
Definition 2 A matching µ is stable if is individually rational and there is no worker-
firm pair that blocks µ. A matching µ is stable* if it is individually rational and there
is no pair that blocks* µ.
Notation. Given a preference profile P , we denote the set of stable matchings by S(P ),
and the set of stable* matchings by S∗(P ).
Remark. We shall show below that S∗(P ) equals the core. It follows then from results
in RS that S∗(P ) ⊆ S(P ) and that, in general, S∗(P ) 6= S(P ). As stable* is a new
concept, we include independent proofs of these two facts in Lemma 1 and Example 2.
Lemma 1 S∗(P ) ⊆ S(P )
Proof. Let µ ∈ S∗(P ), and assume that µ /∈ S(P ). Since µ is individually rational, and
µ /∈ S(P ), there exist (w, f) ∈ W × F such that
fP (w)µ(w) (1)
and
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) . (2)
Statement (2) implies that
Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))P (f)µ (f) . (3)
Let B = {w}, and A = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ∩ µ (f) . We shall prove that (B, f)
blocks* µ. Since B = {w}, statement (1) gives us the first part of the definition of block*.
Also,
A = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ∩ µ (f)
= Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) \{w}
= Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) \B,
so statement (3) implies that
[A ∪B] = Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))P (f)µ (f) ,
and we have the second part of the definition of block*. Thus, µ /∈ S∗ (P ) .
5
Example 2 This example shows that S∗(P ) and S(P ) may be different. Let F = {f}
and W = {w1, w2, w3} be the sets of agents. Let the preference profile P be defined as:
P (f) = {w1, w2}, {w3},
P (w1) = f ,
P (w2) = f , and
P (w3) = f .
Consider the following matchings:
f ∅
µ1 = {w1, w2} {w3} and
f ∅ ∅
µ2 = {w3} {w1} {w2} .
We have that µ2 /∈ S∗(P ), because there exists ({w1, w2}, f) such that
fP (w1)µ1(w1) = ∅
fP (w2)µ1(w2) = ∅
and (A = ∅ ⊆ µ2(f))
{w1, w2}P (f)µ2(f) = {w3}.
Also we have that S (P ) = {µ1, µ2}, and S∗ (P ) = {µ1}.
Definition 3 Let P be a preference profile. The core is the set of matchings µ for which
there is no F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W with F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅, and µˆ ∈ M such that: for all w ∈ W ′,
and for all f ∈ F ′
1. µˆ(w) ⊆ F ′, and µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′,
2. µˆ(w)R(w)µ(w),
3. µˆ(f)R(f)µ(f),
4. and µˆ(s)P (s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′.
We shall denote the core by Cw(P ).
Theorem 3 S∗ (P ) = Cw(P ).
Proof. First we shall prove that S∗(P ) ⊆ Cw(P ). Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ), and suppose that
µ /∈ Cw(P ). Let F ′ ⊆ F , W ′ ⊆ W with F ′ ∪W ′ 6= ∅, and let µˆ ∈ M such that, for all
w ∈ W ′, and for all f ∈ F ′
µˆ(w) ⊆ F ′, and µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′, (4)
µˆ(w)R(w)µ(w), (5)
µˆ(f)R(f)µ(f), (6)
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and
µˆ(s)P (s)µ(s) for at least one s ∈ W ′ ∪ F ′.
We shall need the following
Claim. There exists f ∈ F ′, such that µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f) if and only if there is w ∈ W ′ such
that µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w).
Proof of the claim. Let µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f). Because µ is individually rational, we have
that µˆ(f) * µ(f), so let w ∈ µˆ(f)\µ(f). By condition (4), we have that w ∈ µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′;
but then w /∈ µ(f) and condition (5) implies that
µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w).
Now suppose there exists w ∈ W ′ such that µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w). Let f = µˆ(w). Then f 6=
µ (w), so w /∈ µ (f) . Thus µˆ(f) 6= µ(f), and condition (6) implies that µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f).
This proves the claim.
By the claim, we can assume that there exists f ∈ F ′ such that µˆ(f) 6= µ(f). Let
B = µˆ(f)\µ(f) and A = µˆ(f) ∩ µ(f) then
A ∪B = µˆ(f)P (f)µ(f). (7)
Now, B ⊆ µˆ(f) ⊆ W ′, and B ∩ µ(f) = ∅. Condition (5) implies that, for all w ∈ B,
f = µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w). (8)
Statements (7) and (8) contradict that µ ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Now we shall prove that Cw(P ) ⊆ S∗(P ). Let µ ∈ Cw (P ), and suppose that µ /∈
S∗(P ). First we shall show that µ is individually rational. Assume that there exists f ∈ F
such that
µ (f) 6= Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) .
Let µ̂ (f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) , F ′ = {f} ⊆ F, W ′ = µ̂ (f) ⊆ W. It is easy to see that
µ /∈ Cw (P ), as µˆ(w)R(w)µ(w) for all w ∈ W ′, while µˆ(f)R(f)µ(f). Thus,
µ (f) = Ch (µ (f) , P (f)) , (9)
for all f ∈ F .
Now suppose there is w ∈ W such that
∅P (w)µ (w) .
Let µ̂ (w) = ∅, W ′ = {w}, F ′ = ∅. As before, µ /∈ Cw (P ) because µˆ(w)P (w)µ(w). Thus,
µ (w)R (w) ∅, (10)
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for all w ∈ W . Statements (9) and (10) establish that µ is individual rational.
Assume that there exist (B, f) ∈ 2W × F with B 6= ∅, such that: for all w ∈ B
fP (w)µ(w),
and there exists A ⊆ µ (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f)µ (f) .
Letting µˆ(f) = A ∪ B, F ′ = {f} and W ′ = B, it follows that µ /∈ Cw (P ). A contradic-
tion.
2.3 Lattices and chains
Let X be a set, and R a partial order—a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric binary
relation—on X. For any subset A of X, infRA (supRA) is the greatest (lowest) lower
(upper) bound on A, in the order R. We say that the pair (X,R) is a lattice if whenever
x, y ∈ X, both x ∧R y = infR{x, y} and x ∨R y = supR{x, y} exist in X. We say that
a lattice (X,R) is complete if for every nonempty subset A of X, infRA and supRA
exist in X. Note that any finite lattice is complete. A lattice (X,R) is a chain if, for
any x, y ∈ X, xRy or yRx, or both, are true.
3 The core as a set of fixed points
We shall construct a map T on a superset of M such that the set of fixed points of T is
the core.
3.1 Pre-matchings
Say that a pair ν = (νF , νW ), with νF : F → 2W and νW : W → F ∪ {∅}, is a pre-
matching . Let VW (VF ) denote the set of all νW (νF ) functions. Thus, V = VF × VW
denotes the set of pre–matchings ν = (νF , νW ). The superset ofM we need turns out to
be the set of pre-matchings V (pre-matchings were first used by Adachi (2000)).
A pre-matching ν = (νF , νW ), and a matching µ are equivalent if µ(f) = νF (f) for
all f , and µ(w) = νW (w) for all w. A pre-matching ν = (νF , νW ) is equivalent to some
matching if and only if ν is such that νW (w) = f if and only if w ∈ νF (f) .
Notation.
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1. We shall identify matchings and pre-matchings when they are equivalent, so if ν ∈ V
is equivalent to some matching µ we shall say that ν is a matching. Hence M is a
subset of V .
2. If ν = (νF , νW ) is a pre-matching, we shall some times write ν(f) for νF (f) and
ν(w) for νW (w).
3.2 T and the core
Let ν be a pre-matching, and let
U (f, ν) = {w ∈ W : fR (w) ν (w)} ,
and
V (w, ν) = {f ∈ F : w ∈ Ch (ν (f) ∪ {w}) , P (f)} ∪ {∅}.
The set U(f, ν) is the set of workers w that are willing to give up ν(w) in exchange for
f . The set V (w, µ) is the set of firms f that are willing to hire w, possibly after firing
some of the workers it was assigned by ν.
Now, define T : V → V by
(Tν) (s) =
{
Ch (U (s, ν) , P (s)) if s ∈ F
max
P (s)
{V (s, ν)} if s ∈ W.
The map T has a simple interpretation: (Tν)(f) is firm f ’s optimal team of workers,
among those willing to work for f , and (Tν)(w) is the firm preferred by w among the
firms that are willing to hire w.
Notation. We shall denote by E the set of fixed points of T , so E = {ν ∈ V : ν = Tν}.
Theorem 4 E = S∗ (P ).
Before we prove Theorem 4, note that Theorems 3 and 4 imply:
Corollary 5 E = Cw (P ).
Proof of Theorem 4 . To make the proof clearer, we present the first part of the proof
as Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 If ν ∈ E then ν is a matching and ν is individually rational.
Proof. Let ν = (νF , νW ) ∈ E .
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1. Fix w ∈ νF (f), we shall prove that f = νW (w). ν ∈ E implies that
w ∈ νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
Thus w ∈ U(f, ν).
The definition of U(f, ν) implies
fR (w) νW (w). (11)
Now, νF (f) ∪ {w} = νF (f) and ν ∈ E , imply that
νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch(U(f, ν), P (f)). (12)
So
Ch (νF (f) , P (f))
(1)
= Ch (Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , P (f))
(2)
= Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f))
(3)
= νF (f) .
Equalities (1) and (3) follow from statement (12). Equality (2) is a simple property
of choice sets: Ch (Ch (S, P (f)) , P (f)) = Ch (S, P (f)). Hence we have that
νF (f) = Ch(νF (f) , P (f)). (13)
Now w ∈ νF (f) implies that Ch(νF (f) , P (f)) = Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). So
statement (13) implies that f ∈ V (w, ν). But
νW (w) = (Tν)(w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, ν)} ,
so
νW (w)R (w) f. (14)
Statements (11), (14) and anti-symmetry of preference relations imply that, f =
νW (w).
2. Let f = νW (w), we shall prove that w ∈ νF (f). First, note that f = νW (w) implies
that
w ∈ U(f, ν). (15)
Second, note that
f = νW (w) = (Tν) (w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, ν)} ,
because ν ∈ E . Let us then record here
νW (w)R (w) ∅. (16)
Now, f ∈ V (w, ν), so we must have w ∈ Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) by the definition
of V (w, ν). That is,
w ∈ Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f))R (f) νF (f) , (17)
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Now, ν ∈ E implies that
νF (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) . (18)
The definition of choice set implies
νF (f) ⊆ U (f, ν) , (19)
and
νF (f)R (f)U (f, ν) .
But statements (15) and (19) give
U (f, ν) ⊇ Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)).
The definition of choice set implies
νF (f)R (f)Ch(νF (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). (20)
Statements (17) and (20), and anti-symmetry of the preference relations imply that,
w ∈ νF (f).
By 1 and 2, w ∈ vF (f) if and only if f = vW (w). So, ν is a matching. Statements
(13) and (16) imply that ν is individually rational.
Now we finish the proof of Theorem 4
Let µ ∈ E . By Lemma 6 we know that µ is an individually rational matching.
Fix f ∈ F, B ⊆ W such that B 6= ∅. We assume that, for all w ∈ B,
fP (w)µ (w) . (21)
By the definition of U (f, µ), we have that
B ⊆ U (f, µ) . (22)
Let A ⊆ µ (f). Because µ is a matching, we have that for all w ∈ A, f = µ (w) . So the
definition of U (f, µ) implies that
A ⊆ U (f, µ) . (23)
Now, µ ∈ E so µ (f) = (Tµ) (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)); statements (22) and (23) imply
then
µ (f)R (f)Ch (A ∪B,P (f))R (f)A ∪B. (24)
Statements (21) and (24) show that there is not (B, f) that blocks* µ. Thus µ ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Let µ ∈ S∗ (P ) and assume that µ 6= Tµ. First assume that there exist f ∈ F such
that
µ (f) 6= (Tµ) (f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)) = C ⊆ U (f, µ) .
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Let A = C ∩µ (f) , and B = C\µ (f) . Because µ is an individually rational matching we
have that µ (f) ⊆ U (f, µ) and B 6= ∅. Now,
A ∪B = CP (f)µ (f) . (25)
Also,
fP (w)µ (w) (26)
for all w ∈ B, as B ⊆ C ⊆ U (f, µ). Statements (25) and (26) imply that (B, f) block*
µ, which contradicts that µ ∈ S∗(P ).
Hence, for all f ∈ F ,
µ (f) = (Tµ) (f) . (27)
Assume that there exists w ∈ W such that
µ (w) 6= (Tµ) (w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, µ)} = f ∈ V (w, µ) ,
so
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) ,
by the definition on V (w, µ).
But µ is a matching, so we have that w /∈ µ(f) and µ (w) ∈ V (w, µ) . This implies
that
fP (w)µ (w) , (28)
and
w ∈ Ch (µ (f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) = C.
Let A = C ∩ µ (f) = C − {w}, and B = {w}. Then (B, f) blocks* µ because of
C = A ∪BP (f)µ (f) ,
and statement (28). Hence, for all w ∈ W ,
µ (w) = (Tµ) (w) . (29)
Statements (27) and (29) imply that µ = Tµ. Hence µ ∈ E .
4 The T -algorithm
The T -algorithm is very simple: start at some ν ∈ V and iterate Tν until two iterations
are identical. When two iterations are identical, stop.
We prove that, when the T -algorithm stops, it must be at a core matching. Further,
we show that once the T -algorithm hits on a matching µ (not just a pre-matching), µ
must be in the core. Hence, the T -algorithm “wanders” around pre-matchings until it
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finds a matching—it will stop at the matching it finds, and it will be a core matching. It
follows, of course, that if the core is empty the algorithm must cycle, and that the cycle
will only involve pre-matchings that are not matchings.
The algorithm is very simple, but we include a detailed description to be as clear as
possible, and to introduce some notation that we shall use in the proofs below:
Algorithm 1 (T -algorithm)
1. Set ν0 = ν. Set ν1 = Tν0 and k = 1.
2. While νk 6= νk−1, do:
(a) Set k = k + 1,
(b) set νk = Tνk−1.
3. Set µ = νk. Stop.
Proposition 7 If the T -algorithm stops at µ ∈ V, then µ is a matching (µ ∈ M) and
µ is in the core. If νk is in the core, for some iteration k of the T -algorithm, then the
algorithm stops at µ = νk.
Proof. If the algorithm stops at µ then νk = νk−1 = µ. Then, µ = Tνk−1 = Tµ, so
µ ∈ E . By Corollary 5, µ ∈ Cw(P ). On the other hand, if νk is in the core, then νk is a
fixed point of T by Corollary 5. Then the T -algorithm stops at µ = νk.
Proposition 8 If νk is a matching, for some iteration k in the T -algorithm, then the
algorithm stops at µ = νk, and thus νk is a core matching.
We shall present the proof of Proposition 8 as two lemmata:
Lemma 9 Let ν ∈ V be a pre–matching. If ν1 = Tν is a matching, then ν1 is individually
rational.
Proof. For all f ∈ F ,
ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
So
Ch (ν1 (f) , P (f))
(1)
= Ch (Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , P (f))
(2)
= Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f))
(3)
= ν1 (f) .
Equalities (1) and (3) follow because ν1 = Tν. Equality (2) is a property of choice sets.
So, for all f ∈ F ,
ν1 (f) = Ch
(
ν1 (f) , P (f)
)
. (30)
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For all w ∈ W ,
ν1 (w) = (Tν) (w) = max
P (w)
{V (w, ν)} ∪ {∅} .
So,
ν1 (w)R (w) ∅. (31)
Statements (30) and (31) show that ν1 is individually rational.
Lemma 10 If Tν is a matching, for some ν ∈ V, then Tν is a core matching. Thus
if νk = Tνk−1 is a matching, then the T -algorithm must stop at νk, and νk is a core
matching.
Proof. We shall prove that, if ν ∈ V is a pre–matching, and ν1 = Tν is a matching,
then ν1 ∈ S∗ (P ) . The lemma follows from Proposition 7, as S∗(P ) = E = Cw(P ).
Assume that ν1 /∈ S∗ (P ) . By Lemma 9, ν1 is individually rational, so there must
exist a (B, f) that blocks ν1. Hence, for all w ∈ B (B 6= ∅),
fP (w) ν1 (w) , (32)
and there must exist A ⊆ ν1 (f) such that
[A ∪B]P (f) ν1 (f) . (33)
But ν1 is a matching, and ν1 = Tν, so we have that for all w ∈ B, w ∈ ν1 (ν1 (w)). But
ν1 (ν1 (w)) = (Tν) (ν1 (w)) = Ch (U (ν1 (w) , ν) , P (ν1 (w))), so that, w ∈ U (ν1 (w) , ν),
i.e.
ν1 (w)R (w) ν (w) . (34)
Statements (32) and (34) imply that, for all w ∈ B, fR (w) ν (w), i.e.
B ⊆ U (f, ν) . (35)
Now, A ⊆ ν1 (f) and ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) , so
A ⊆ U (f, ν) . (36)
Statements (33), (35), and (36) contradict that ν1 (f) = (Tν) (f) = Ch (U (f, ν) , P (f)) .
Thus ν1 ∈ S∗ (P ) .
Remarks.
• Proposition 8, and Example 11 below, imply that the T -algorithm and the DAA
are different algorithms; we have not simply written down the DAA using different
language.
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• Unlike the DAA, the T -algorithm only stops at a core matchings. Example 11
below shows how the T -algorithm succeeds in finding a core matching, while the
DAA stops at a non-core matching.
• When the core is empty, the T -algorithm must cycle. We illustrate this in Exam-
ple 12 below.
Example 11 Let F = {f1, f2} , W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} , and the preference profile P be
defined by:
P (f1) = {w1, w2}, {w3, w4}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4},
P (f2) = {w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w4}, {w3, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4},
P (w1) = f1, f2,
P (w2) = f2, f1,
P (w3) = f1, f2, and
P (w4) = f1, f2.
Note that P is not substitutable, as w1 ∈ Ch ({w1, w2, w3, w4}, P (f1)) = {w1, w2} while
w1 /∈ Ch ({w1, w3, w4}, P (f1)) = {w3, w3}. The T -algorithm starting at
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
ν0 = {w1, w2} {w1, w2} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
does:
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
U(f, ν0)/V (w, ν0) = {w1, w2, w3, w4} {w1, w2, w3, w4} f1, f2 f1, f2 ∅ ∅
ν1 = {w1, w2} {w1, w2} f1 f2 ∅ ∅
U(f, ν1)/V (w, ν1) = {w1, w3, w4} {w2, w3, w4} f1, f2 f1, f2 ∅ ∅
ν2 = {w3, w4} {w2, w4} f1 f2 ∅ ∅
U(f, ν2)/V (w, ν2) = {w1, w3, w4} {w2, w3, w4} f2 f2 f1 f1, f2
ν3 = {w3, w4} {w2, w4} f2 f2 f1 f1
U(f, ν3)/V (w, ν3) = {w1, w3, w4} {w1, w2} f2 f2 f1 f1, f2
ν4 = {w3, w4} {w1, w2} f2 f2 f1 f1
Note that νi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 are not matchings; ν4 is a matching so, by Proposition 8,
ν4 is a core matching.
On the other hand, the DAA stops at a matching that is not in the core. For the
DAA, the equivalent to starting the T -algorithm at ν0 is, as we shall see in Section 5,
the DAA with firms proposing. The DAA with firms proposing stops at the matching
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3 w4
µ = {w3, w4} {w2} ∅ f2 f1 f1.
But µ is not in the core, as f2P (w1)µ(w1) = ∅, f2R(w2)µ(w2) = f2, and {w1, w2}P (f2){w2}
implies that ({w1, w2}, f2) blocks* µ.
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Example 12 Now we illustrate the T -algorithm in an example with an empty core. Let
F = {f1, f2, f3} , and W = {w1, w2, w3} . be the sets of agents. Let preferences be:
P (f1) = {w1, w2}, {w3},
P (f2) = {w2, w3}, {w1},
P (f3) = {w1, w3}, {w2},
P (w1) = f1, f3, f2,
P (w2) = f2, f1, f3, and
P (w3) = f3, f2, f1.
Let us start the T -algorithm at
f1 f2 f3 w1 w2 w3
ν0 = ∅ ∅ ∅ f1 f2 f3.
The T -algorithm does
f1 f2 f3 w1 w2 w3
U(f, ν0)/V (w, ν0) = {w1} {w2} {w3} f2 f3 f1
ν1 = ∅ ∅ ∅ f2 f3 f1
U(f, ν1)/V (w, ν1) = {w1, w2, w3} {w1, w2, w3} {w1, w2, w3} f2 f3 f1
ν2 = {w1, w2} {w2, w3} {w1, w3} f2 f3 f1
U(f, ν2)/V (w, ν2) = {w1, w2, w3} {w1, w2, w3} {w1, w2, w3} f1, f3 f1, f2 f2, f3
ν3 = {w1, w2} {w2, w3} {w1, w3} f1 f2 f3
U(f, ν3)/V (w, ν3) = {w1} {w2} {w3} f1, f3 f1, f2 f2, f3
ν4 = ∅ ∅ ∅ f1 f2 f3
Note that νi, i = 0, . . . 4, in V are not matchings. The algorithm cycles because ν0 = ν4.
It is easy to verify that S∗(P ) = ∅, so the T -algorithm must cycle.
5 The lattice structure of the core
We shall introduce a partial order on V such that, if preferences are substitutable, T is a
monotone increasing map. Tarski’s fixed point theorem then delivers a lattice structure
on E , and thus on Cw(P ).
Definition 4 Define the following partial orders on VF , VW and V:
1. P (F ) on VF by νFP (F ) ν ′F if and only if ν ′F 6= νF and, for all f in F , νF (f) =
ν ′F (f) or
νF (f) = Ch (νF (f) ∪ ν ′F (f) , P (f)) .
2. P (W ) on VW by νWP (W ) ν ′W if and only if ν ′W 6= νW and
νW (w)R (w) ν
′
W (w) for all w ∈ W.
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3. The weak partial orders associated to P (F ) and P (W ) are denoted R(F ) and R(W ),
defined as: νFR(F )ν
′
F if νF = ν
′
F or νFP (F )ν
′
F , and νWR(W )ν
′
W if νW = ν
′
W or
νWP (W )ν
′
W .
4. P (F ) on V by νP (F ) ν ′ iff νFP (F ) ν ′F and ν ′WR (W ) νW , or νFR (F ) ν ′F and
ν ′WP (W ) νW .
5. P (W ) on V by νP (W ) ν ′ iff νWP (W ) ν ′W and ν ′FR (F ) νF , or νWR (W ) ν ′W and
ν ′FP (F ) νF .
Definition 5 A firm f ’s preference ordering P (f) satisfies substitutability if for any
set S ⊆ W containing workers w and w¯ (w 6= w¯), if w ∈ Ch (S, P (f)) then w ∈
Ch (S\ {w¯} , P (f)). A preference profile P is substitutable if, for each firm f , the
preference ordering P (f) satisfies substitutability.
Theorem 13 Let P be substitutable. Then (Cw(P ), P (F )) and (Cw(P ), P (W )) are non-
empty complete lattices, and
1. infP (F )Cw(P ) = supP (W ) Cw(P ),
2. supP (F ) Cw(P ) = infP (W ) Cw(P ).
Theorem 13 says that there are two distinguished core matchings, µW and µF such
that: For firms, µW = infP (F ) Cw(P ) is worse, and µF = supP (F ) Cw(P ) is better, than
any other core matchings. For workers µW = supP (W ) Cw(P ) is better, and µF =
infP (W ) Cw(P ) is worse, than any other core matching.
Proof of Theorem 13. We shall present the proof as 4 simple lemmata. We assume
that P is substitutable in the rest of the section.
Notation. Let V ′ = {ν ∈ V : ν(s)R(s)∅, for all s ∈ F ∪W}.
Remark. For all ν ∈ V , Tν ∈ V ′
Lemma 14 (V ′, P (F )) is a complete lattice.
Proof. For each f ∈ F , let Xf = {A ⊆ W : AR(f)∅}, and let ≥f be the partial order
on Xf defined by A ≥ B iff A = B or A = Ch(A ∪ B,P (f)). By Blair (1988) (see also
Alkan (2002)), (Xf ,≥f ) is a complete lattice.
For each w, let Xw = {f ∈ F : fR(w)∅}; (Xw, R(w)) is a totally ordered finite set,
so it is a complete lattice.
Now, V ′ = (×f∈FXf ) × (×w∈WXw), and P (F ) is the product order of the partial
orders introduced above. Hence (V ′, P (F )) is a complete lattice.
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Lemma 15 Let µ and µ′ be pre–matchings. If µ′R (F )µ then, for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F ,
U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′)
V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′)
Proof. Let w ∈ U(f, µ). We have that fR (w)µ(w), but µ(w)R (w)µ′(w) so w ∈
U(f, µ′). This proves U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′).
Now we shall prove that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′). First, if V (w, µ′) = {∅}, then there is
nothing to prove, as {∅} = V (w, µ′) ⊆ V (w, µ). Suppose that V (w, µ′) 6= {∅} , and let
f ∈ V (w, µ′). Then,
w ∈ Ch(µ′(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)). (37)
But µ′R (F )µ, so the definition ofR(F ) implies that, for all f ∈ F , either µ′(f) = µ(f)
so w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)), or
µ′(f) = Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) .
Then statement (37) implies that
w ∈ Ch (µ′(f) ∪ {w}, P (f))
= Ch (Ch (µ′ (f) ∪ µ (f) , P (f)) ∪ {w}, P (f))
(1)
=
Ch (µ′(f) ∪ µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
Equality (1) is from Proposition 2.3 of Blair (1988) (He showed that, if P is substi-
tutable, then Ch (A ∪B,P (f)) = Ch (Ch (A,P (f)) ∪B,P (f)) for all A and B). Now,
substitutability of P implies that
w ∈ Ch (µ(f) ∪ {w}, P (f)) .
This means that f ∈ V (w, µ) , thus completing the proof that V (w, µ) ⊇ V (w, µ′).
Lemma 16 E is a nonempty and complete lattice.
Proof. First we show that T |V ′ is monotone increasing. That is, whenever µ′R (F )µ,
we have (Tµ′)R (F ) (Tµ).
Let µ′R (F )µ, and fix f ∈ F and w ∈ W . Lemma 15 says that U(f, µ) ⊆ U(f, µ′).
We first show that
Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) = Ch ([Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f))] , P (f)) . (38)
To see this, let S ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ∪ Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)). Then S ⊆ U(f, µ) ∪
U(f, µ′) = U(f, µ′), so Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f))R(f)S. But, Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) ⊆ Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f))∪
Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so we have established statement 38.
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Now, (Tµ′)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ′) , P (f)) and (Tµ)(f) = Ch (U (f, µ) , P (f)), so state-
ment 38 implies that
(Tµ′)(f) = Ch([(Tµ′)(f) ∪ (Tµ)(f)] , P (f))). (39)
We now show that (Tµ)(w)R(w)(Tµ′)(w). Lemma 15 says that V (w, µ′) ⊆ V (w, µ).
So,
(Tµ)(w) = max
P (f)
{V (w, µ)}R (w) max
P (f)
{V (w, µ′)} = (Tµ′)(w). (40)
Statements 39 and 40 imply that (Tµ′)R(F )(Tµ), as f ∈ F and w ∈ W were arbitrary.
Finally, T (V) ⊆ V ′ so E ⊆ V ′, and E equals the set of fixed points of T |V ′ . T (V) ⊆ V ′
also implies that the restricted map T |V ′ has range in V ′.
Now we have that T |V ′ : V ′ → V ′ is monotone increasing, and V ′ is a complete lattice
by Lemma 14. So Tarski’s fixed point theorem implies that (E , P (F )) is a non-empty
complete lattice.
Lemma 17 (Cw(P ), P (F )) and (Cw(P ), P (W )) are non-empty complete lattices, and
1. infP (F ) Cw(P ) = supP (W )Cw(P ),
2. supP (F ) Cw(P ) = infP (W )Cw(P ).
Proof. By Corollary 5 and Lemma 16 we are done with (Cw(P ), P (F )). The orders
P (F ) and P (W ) are order-duals, (Topkis (1998)) hence (Cw(P ), P (W )) is a non-empty
complete lattice, and statements 1 and 2 in the lemma are immediate.
6 The T -algorithm when preferences are substitutable.
When preferences are substitutable, the T -algorithm
1. finds the worker-optimal core matching (infP (F ) Cw(P )) and the firm-optimal core
matching (supP (F ) Cw(P )),
2. is computationally efficient—we can give a bound on its computational complexity
and show that the bound is likely to be quite small,
3. calculates the lattice operations “join” and “meet,” on the Cw(P ) lattice.
Result 1 is important because it shows that the T -algorithm does the job of the DAA.
Further, by result 2 we have an idea of the T -algorithm’s computational complexity, which
is an open problem for the DAA in the many-to-one case. In a very simple example, we
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show that, while the “size” of the problem is 30, 000 iterations, the T -algorithm needs
at most 9 iterations to find a core matching. Our result on the complexity of the T -
algorithm is similar to Topkis’s (1979, see also Topkis (1998)) results on algorithms for
finding equilibria in supermodular games.
Result 3: A number of papers have sought to improve on Blair’s lattice operations
(Mart´ınez, Masso´ Neme, and Oviedo (2000) and Alkan (2002)) by restricting firms’ pref-
erences. We show that, with only substitutability, the T -algorithm can compute the
lattice operations—thus allowing for a practical solution to the problem of Blair’s lattice
operations.
6.1 The firm- and worker-optimal core matchings
Proposition 18 If P is substitutable, the T -algorithm starting at infP (F ) V ′ stops at the
worker-optimal core matching infP (F ) Cw(P ); the T -algorithm starting at supP (F ) V ′ stops
at the firm-optimal core matching supP (F ) Cw(P ).
Proof. When preferences are substitutable, T is a monotone map on the complete
lattice V ′. Proposition 18 follows then from standard results, see Topkis (1979) or Topkis
(1998).
Remarks.
1. The pre-matching infP (F ) V ′ is ν ∈ V with ν(f) = {∅} and
ν(w) = max
P (w)
F.
The pre-matching supP (F ) V ′ is ν ∈ V with ν(f) = Ch(W,P (f)) and ν(w) = {∅}.
2. The T -algorithm starting at points that are not infP (F ) V ′ or supP (F ) V ′ may not
converge. For example, one can show that the T -algorithm starting at the pre-
matching
ν =
((
sup
P (F )
V ′
)
F
,
(
inf
P (F )
V ′
)
W
)
cycles.
6.2 Complexity of the T -algorithm
We shall now give a bound on the computational complexity of the T -algorithm, but we
need some auxiliary definitions first.
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For each f , let Xf = {A ⊆ W : AR(f)∅}, and let ≥f be the partial order on Xf
defined by A ≥ B iff A = Ch(A ∪ B,P (f)) or A = B. Let qf be the size of the longest
≥f -chain in Xf . For each w, let Xw = {f ∈ F : fR(w)∅}, and let qw be the number of
elements in Xw.
To see what the definitions mean, consider the following example.
Example 19 F = {f1, f2, f3} , and W = {w1, w2, w3} .
P (f1) = {w1, w3}, {w1, w2}, {w2, w3}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}
P (f2) = {w1, w3}, {w2, w3}, {w1, w2}, {w3}, {w2}, {w1}
P (f3) = {w1, w3}, {w1, w2}, {w2, w3}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}
P (w1) = f1, f2,
P (w2) = f2, f1,
P (w3) = f1, f2.
Consider firm f1: Xf1 = {{w1, w3}, {w1, w2}, {w2, w3}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}}. The prob-
lem is simple enough that we can enumerate all chains in Xf1:
{w1, w3} >f1 {w1, w2} >f1 {w1}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w1, w2} >f1 {w2}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w2, w3} >f1 {w2}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w2, w3} >f1 {w3}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w1}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w2}
{w1, w3} >f1 {w3}
{w1, w2} >f1 {w1}
{w1, w2} >f1 {w2}
{w2, w3} >f1 {w2}
{w2, w3} >f1 {w3}
To see why these are all chains, note that {w1, w3} >f1 B for all B ∈ Xf1\ {{w1, w3}};
that {w1, w2} ≯f1 {w2, w3} and {w1, w2} ≯f1 {w3}, but that {w1, w2} >f1 {w1} and
{w1, w2} >f1 {w2}. Similarly with {w2, w3} in place of {w1, w2}. Finally, there are no
A, B in {{w1}, {w2}, {w3}} with A >f1 B.
Hence, qf1 ≤ 3. By similar calculations for firms f2 and f3, qf ≤ 3 for all f ∈ F .
For workers, the size of the longest chain in {f1, f2, f3} is qw = 2, as Xw has only got 2
elements.
Proposition 20 If P is substitutable, the T -algorithm starting at infP (F ) V ′ (supP (F ) V ′)
stops at the worker-optimal (firm-optimal) core matching in less than∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1)
iterations.
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Proof. Let ν0, ν1, . . . νk be the sequence generated by the T -algorithm before it stops at
a core matching νk. The number of iterations before the algorithm stops at νk is k, we
shall prove that k ≤∑s∈F∪W (qs − 1).
Assume—without loss of generality—that we started the T -algorithm at ν0 = infP (F ) V ′.
Since ν1 = (Tν0)P (F )ν0 and T is monotone increasing (see the proof of Theorem 13),
νkP (F )νk−1P (F ) . . . ν1P (F )ν0.
For each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, it must be that νl(f) = νl−1(f) or that νl(f) = Ch(νl(f) ∪
νl−1(f), P (f)) for all f , and νl−1(w)R(w)νl(w) for all w. Also, for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, either
νl(f) 6= νl−1(f) and νl(f) = Ch(νl(f)∪νl−1(f), P (f)) for some for f or νl−1(w)P (w)νl(w)
for some w—recall that P (F ) is a strict order, see Definition 4. Say that l is an f -step if
νl(f) 6= νl−1(f) and νl(f) = Ch(νl(f)∪νl−1(f), P (f)) for firm f . Say that l is a w-step if
νl−1(w)P (w)νl(w) for worker w. There cannot be more than qs− 1 s-steps, as a number
of, say r steps involves a chain of r + 1 elements in Xs. Now k is smaller than the sum
over all s ∈ W ∪ F of all s-steps, so
k ≤
∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1).
But k is the number of iterations of the T -algorithm before it finds νk.
Remark. Recall that |W | = m and |F | = n, so the number of pre-matchings is
2nm(n+ 1)m,
a number which is normally orders of magnitude larger than the bound in Proposition 20:
In Example 19, Proposition 20 implies that the T -algorithm converges before∑
s∈F∪W
(qs − 1) = 9
iterations. Compare with the number of pre-matchings: 32768. The number of matchings
is smaller than the number of pre-matchings, but still substantially larger than 9.It
may be unfair to compare the complexity of the T -algorithm to the number of pre-
matchings, after all the T -algorithm will not involve pre-matchings where agents are
matched to unacceptable partners—but still, the number of pre-matchings that only
involve acceptable partners is 9261.
6.3 Computing the lattice operations
Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Cw (P ) . We shall look at the problem of finding µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2, the join (least
upper bound) of µ1 and µ2 in the (Cw (P ) , P (F ))-lattice. One can solve the problem of
finding µ1 ∧P (F ) µ2 in the (Cw (P ) , P (F ))-lattice in a similar way.
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Mart´ınez, Masso´, Neme and Oviedo (2000 and 2001) prove that, when preferences
satisfy substitutability and an additional assumption (which they call q-separability)
there is a simple formula for µ1∨P (F )µ2 (see Alkan (2002) for a similar result). Mart´ınez,
Masso´, Neme and Oviedo prove that µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2 is
ν(s) =
{
Ch (µ1 (s) ∪ µ2 (s) , P (s)) if s ∈ F
min
P (s)
{µ1 (s) , µ2 (s)} if s ∈ W. (41)
In general, though, when preferences are only substitutable, there is no formula for
µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2. In fact, ν defined in (41) is a pre-matching but not necessarily a matching.
We prove that, if one starts the T -algorithm at ν, it will stop at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2. Hence we
give a practical solution to Blair’s problem of calculating µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2. 3
Theorem 21 Let P be substitutable, let µ1 and µ2 be core matchings, and v be defined
as in (41). The T -algorithm started at v stops at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
Proof. We shall present the proof as two lemmata.
Lemma 22 Let P be substitutable, and let
Vˆ = {ν ∈ V : νR (F ) ν} .
Then T Vˆ ⊆ Vˆ .
Proof. First we shall prove that ν is the least upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V . By the
definition of ν, νR(F )µ1 and νR(F )µ2.
Let ν be an upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V , we shall prove that νR(F )ν. For any
f ∈ F :
ν (f)R (f)µ1 (f) ⇐⇒ ν (f) (1)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) , P (f))
ν (f)R (f)µ2 (f) ⇐⇒ ν (f) (2)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f)) .
We have that
Ch (ν (f) ∪ ν (f) , P (f)) (3)= Ch (ν (f) ∪ Ch (µ1 (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f)) , P (f))
(4)
= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(5)
= Ch (Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ1 (f) , P (f)) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(6)
= Ch (ν (f) ∪ µ2 (f) , P (f))
(7)
= ν (f) .
3Blair’s proof of the existence of µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2 can also be expressed as an algorithm for calculating
µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
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Where equality (3) follows from the definition of ν. Equalities (4) and (5) follow from
substitutability and Proposition 2.3 of Blair (1988). Equality (6) follows from equality
(1). Equality (7) follows from equality (2) . Thus,
νFR (F ) νF . (42)
Now, νR (F )µ1 and νR (F )µ2 imply that, for any w ∈ W,
µ1 (w)R (w) ν (w) , and
µ2 (w)R (w) ν (w) .
But then,
ν (w) = min
P (w)
{
µ1 (w) , µ2 (w)
}
R (w) ν (w) .
This and condition (42) implies that νR (F ) ν. Hence ν is the least upper bound on
{µ1, µ2} in V .
Now we shall prove that T Vˆ ⊆ Vˆ . Let ν ∈ Vˆ , then νR(F )νR(F )µ1 and νR(F )νR(F )µ2.
But then TνR(F )Tµ1 and TνR(F )Tµ2, as T is monotone. Now, µ1 and µ2 are core
matchings, so µ1 = Tµ1 and µ2 = Tµ2; then Tν is an upper bound on {µ1, µ2} in V . But
ν is the least upper bound, so TνR(F )ν and thus Tν ∈ Vˆ .
Lemma 23 The T -algorithm starting at ν stops at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
Proof. By Lemma 22, T |Vˆ : Vˆ → Vˆ . T is monotone and ν is the smallest pre-matching
in Vˆ . By Topkis’s (1979) results, the T -algorithm stops at the R(F )-smallest fixed point
of T |Vˆ ; but this is the R(F )-smallest fixed point of T , of those fixed points that are
R(F )-larger than both µ1 and µ2. Then the T -algorithm stops at µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
Remarks.
1. A key part of the proof of Theorem 21 is that ν is the join of µ1 and µ2 in V . By
a similar argument, the T -algorithm calculates the meet, µ1 ∧P (F ) µ2, of any two
core matchings µ1 and µ2. One only needs to start the algorithm at the meet of µ1
and µ2 in V instead of the join. 4
2. The bound presented in Proposition 20 also bounds the number of T -iterations
necessary to calculate µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
We illustrate how the algorithm finds the join of two core matchings using an example
from Roth (1985).
4See Alkan (2002) on how to calculate the meet of µ1 and µ2 in V.
24
Example 24 (Roth 1985). Let F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5} be the set of firms and W =
{w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6} be the set of workers. As in Roth (1985), it will not be necessary
to specify the full preference ordering of each agent, since they may be extended in several
ways and still preserve the substitutability of the firms’ preferences. The preference profile
is as follows:
P (f1) = {w4} , {w1} , {w2, w3, w5, w6} , ..., {w5} , ...
P (f2) = {w2} , {w1, w3} , ...
P (f3) = {w3} , {w2} , ...
P (f4) = {w5} , {w4, w6} , ...
P (f5) = {w6} , {w5} , ...
P (w1) = f2, f1, ...
P (w2) = f1, f3, f2, ...
P (w3) = f1, f2, f3, ...
P (w4) = f4, f1, ...
P (w5) = f1, f5, f4, ...
P (w6) = f1, f4, f5, ...
Consider the following two core matchings
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
µ1 = {w1} {w2} {w3} {w4, w6} {w5} and
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
µ2 = {w4} {w1, w3} {w2} {w5} {w6} .
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6
ν1 = w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 f1 f2 f3 f1 f4 f5
U(f, ν1)/V (w, ν1) = w1, w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 ∅ f2 f3 f1 f4 f5
ν2 = w4 w2 w3 w5 w6 ∅ f2 f3 f1 f4 f5.
ν2 is a matching and ν2 = µ1 ∨P (F ) µ2.
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